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ARGUMENT
A.

APPELLANT HAS RAISED AND PRESERVED HIS ISSUES FOR
APPELLATE REVIEW
Although Appellee's brief focuses on procedural defects without examining the

merits of Appellant's argument as to legal errors committed by the trial court, the fact
remains that the issues presented in Appellant's Brief were raised and preserved at trial.
In fact, Appellant's Brief complied with Appellate Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(5)(A)
when it cited to the record indicating that Appellant's issues were raised and preserved
at the trial level. (Appellant's Brief at 1-4, 13, 19, 21-22, 24-25, 26-27, 29).
Further, Utah courts look at three factors when determining whether a party
properly preserved an issue for appeal: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely
fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App.
1993) (for an issue to be properly preserved for appellate review, it must be raised to a
level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it).
Here, Appellant raised the issues presented on appeal during the proceedings and
trial of this matter in the district court. Appellant has cited to the record indicating
where his issues were raised and preserved for appeal. This was done both in the
presentation of the issues in Appellant's Brief and in the various sections of the
Argument. (Appellant's brief at 1-4; passim).
1

However, even if Appellant may have failed to strictly comply with Rule
24(a)(5)(A), the following demonstrates that in fact Appellant's issues were raised and
preserved in the trial court; as such, the following citations to the record indicate where
Appellant's issues were preserved for appeal:
• The Quitclaim Deed was effective to revoke the Trust and convey the Farm to
Russell Young: R. 636-641; Tr. 777-784; R. passim.
• The Utah Uniform Trust Code applies and is the controlling law with respect
to the Trust: Tr. 776-780
• The execution of the Quitclaim Deed substantially complied with the terms of
the Trust: Tr. 782-784
• The Quitclaim Deed manifested clear and convincing evidence of the settlors'
intent to revoke the Trust: Tr. 791-792; 794
• No consideration was necessary for the Quitclaim Deed to revoke or convey
the Farm to Russell Young: Tr. 17-22, 782
• Eugene had the authority pursuant to the Utah Uniform Trust Code, the terms
of the Trust and pursuant to a Durable Power of Attorney to act alone in
revoking the Trust: Tr. 782-784.

B.

THE QUITCLAIM DEED WAS EFFECTIVE TO REVOKE THE TRUST
AS TO THE FARM AND TO TRANSFER THE PROPERTY TO
RUSSELL
1.

The Motion in Limine did not Dispose of the Issue of the Effect of the
Quitclaim Deed, the Issue is Legal and the Trial Court Addressed and
Heard Evidence on the Effect of the Quitclaim Deed During the Trial

Appellee's attempt to represent that the trial of this matter was not focused on
the effect of the Quitclaim Deed is inaccurate and misguided. As is clear from the
record, the trial court's ruling in limine ("In Limine Ruling") ruled, "absent additional
?

evidence, the deed . . . is invalid to revoke the trust . . . " (R. 739) (emphasis added).
As such, by the In Limine Ruling's own terms, the issue was left open for the trial of
this matter at which point the trial court received additional evidence. In fact, the trial
of this matter took place over three days in which the trial court heard, analyzed and
ruled on the Quitclaim Deed and evidence related to the effect of the Quitclaim Deed.
Further, at the trial of this matter, not only did the trial court consider, hear and
rule on evidence regarding the effect of the Quitclaim Deed with respect to a revocation
or amendment of the Trust, but the trial court stated that it would be happy to hear and
rule on evidence reflecting the effectiveness of the Quitclaim Deed to revoke or amend
the trust pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). (Tr. 22).
Notably, Appellee offers no law whatsoever regarding the effect of a party's
failure to specifically appeal from a pretrial motion in limine which, by its own terms,
provisionally deals with anticipated evidentiary matters where the same are raised and
argued at length during the trial, and where the court makes new orders thereon during
trial. In fact, although Appellee states that the trial court stood firm and did not reopen the issues of the motions in limine (Appellee's Brief at 10), such statement is far
from reality. In fact, the trial court conceded it was possible that it could have been
wrong on its pretrial In Limine Ruling and if so, it was the court's fault. (Tr. 21) The
court also acknowledged that the ruling on the motions in limine would provisionally
apply, although if they were reopened during the trial, the other side would have an
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opportunity to respond to them. (Tr. 22-23). Then, the court considered, heard
evidence and ruled on the effect of the Quitclaim Deed as to whether it accomplished a
partial revocation of the Trust. (Tr. 776-794).
Appellee cites the case of State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228 (Utah App. 1992)
to support the position that Appellant's failure to appeal and argue the pre-trial ruling is
fatal. However, Rodriguez does not discuss a pre-trial ruling or motion in limine.
Rather, Rodriguez stands for the basic principle that a party may not bring an issue up
for the first time on appeal. The appellate court stated that if a defendant fails to raise
an issue on appeal, the court will not raise it sua sponte. Id at 1229. Rodriguez does
not stand for the proposition that the failure to expressly appeal from an in limine
evidentiary ruling precludes review of trial rulings made on the same issues.
Here, the trial court recognized that the In Limine Ruling was provisional,
opened up the issue of the effect of the Quitclaim Deed at trial, and entertained
evidence and argument on the Quitclaim Deed and its effect on the revocation and/or
amendment of the Trust. (Tr. 19-22, 99-105, 214-235, 776-784, 817-822, 830-835,
845-855 ). Specifically, the court stated, that after hearing all of the evidence and at
the end of trial, that if it was wrong on the law in issuing its ruling in limine [on the
Quitclaim Deed] then that was its fault (Tr. 21-23). Importantly, the trial court
recognized that not all the evidence was heard or presented regarding the Quitclaim
Deed during the motions in limine and that the court "can't assume things . . . not

4

provided." Tr. 20.
Therefore, as the issue of the effect of the Quitclaim Deed was not disposed of
with the provisional ruling on the motions in limine, Appellant has no duty to challenge
such; rather, the Appellant has properly challenged the trial court's ruling after the trial
of this matter.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court reaffirmed "that after hearing the
evidence in this case and considering the law, [the Quitclaim Deed] did not alter or
amend the Trust in this case." (Tr. 845). Obviously, this is the ruling Appellant has
appealed from.
a.

The Question of Whether the Quitclaim Deed is Legally
Determinative of Revocation does not Require a Resort to
Factual Findings and is a Question of Law to be Reviewed for
Correctness.

Appellee claims that Appellant has challenged the trial court's factual findings
regarding intent and therefore has a duty to marshal the evidence. Appellee argues that
Appellant has challenged factual findings by stating that at trial "Russell insisted on a
trial to create a record and specifically argued the intent of Eugene and Zelma with
respect to the farm" and Russell has taken "an appeal from the district court's postfactual findings." (Appellee's Brief at 21-22.) However, Appellee then states that
although the trial court recited numerous detailed factual findings of fact that went
"way beyond" its prior ruling in limine, Russell has not challenged a single one of
those findings. (Id). On this point Appellee is correct: Appellant has not challenged
5

the trial court's factual findings.1 Rather, Appellant has challenged several of the trial
court's clear errors of law. As such, Appellant has properly appealed from only the
legal rulings of the trial court and does not have a duty to marshal the factual evidence.
Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193 (Utah 2007).
Apparently, Appellee's position is that an appeal of legal rulings require a
challenge of factual findings and marshaling of evidence. But such is not the case. On
this appeal, Appellant accepts as correct the trial court's factual findings and contends
that the trial court applied the law to those findings in error. If Appellee's position
were adopted, nearly every legal conclusion reached by a trial court would be subject to
a marshaling requirement simply because certain facts at trial relate to the legal issue.
When a trial court makes a clear error of law, such issue is not subject to the
marshaling requirement unless the findings of fact are also challenged. Pierce at 198.
Moreover, although case law does in fact state that marshaling evidence is
required where certain legal conclusions are dependent on a trial court's factual
determinations {United Park City Mines Co., v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Founds,
140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 2006)), none of the present challenged legal errors are

1

As the record reflects, Appellee was ordered to prepare findings of fact by the trial
court who instructed that "whoever does this finding is going to have to review . . . the
tape [because] it's not going to be possible for anybody to get all of this by notes."
(Tr. 831). However, Appellee did not submit or reduce the trial court's ruling in this
matter to separate "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." Therefore, there exist
no "Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law" in this matter.
6

dependent on factual findings. Here, Appellant's challenges are questions of law to be
reviewed by this Court for correctness. (See Appellant's Brief at 1-4).
For example, the effect of the Quitclaim Deed is a purely legal issue. Utah
courts have recognized that a conveyance is valid upon delivery of a deed with present
intent to transfer. Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah App. 1994). Further,
this Court has held that
if a "contract [deed] is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the
intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the
agreement. A court may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain."
Id. quoting Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 110 (Utah 1991).
Here, Appellee's attempt to convince this Court that Appellant has somehow
challenged the trial court's factual findings of intent is misguided. The trial court did
not make a finding of ambiguity relating to the deed but invalidated it based on its legal
conclusion that gifts cannot be made from the Trust. Further, the trial court did not
rely on any extrinsic evidence in its invalidation of the Quitclaim Deed but rather ruled
that the Quitclaim Deed was not supported by fair consideration. (Tr. 834). This legal
conclusion did not depend on any findings of fact made by the trial court.
Regarding the standard of review applied by the reviewing court, this Court
must look at the underlying legal rulings and determine if the legal errors depend on
findings of fact. United Park City Mines Co., v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain
7

Founds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 2006). Here, it is clear that the trial court made
important legal errors regarding the Trust and the effect the Quitclaim Deed had on
partially revoking the Trust which conclusions do not depend on a successful challenge
of the trial court's findings of fact.
As such, the trial court committed legal error by not applying Utah law and
giving effect to the Quitclaim Deed as a legal instrument revoking the trust as to the
Farm. Simply stated, Appellant has not challenged the trial court's factual finding of
intent, or lack thereof, because such findings are not relevant to a legal determination
that the Quitclaim Deed, on its face, is legally sufficient to partially revoke the Trust as
to the Farm.
b.

The Interpretation of the Trust is not Factually Dependent and
is a Question of Law.

Next, Appellee cites case law for the principle that the interpretation of a trust,
which includes consideration of extrinsic evidence, is a question of fact. (Appellee's
Brief at 22). In support of his position, Appellee cites Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d
714, 716 (Utah 1985). However, in Kimball the court made a specific finding that the
contract in question was ambiguous thereby necessitating a resort to extrinsic parol
evidence. Id. at 716. As such, Kimball is inapplicable to the present situation. Here,
there was no finding that the Trust documents were ambiguous and there was no resort
to extrinsic evidence regarding the interpretation of the Trust. Rather, as stated above,
8

the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the Trust did not allow gifts and that
the Quitclaim Deed was not supported by consideration. This was not based on any
extrinsic facts but rather the court's interpretation of the legal effect of the language of
the Trust. Tr. 831-833.
Further, case law establishes that the interpretation of a trust document as well
as a contract or deed is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Kline v. Utah
Department of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah App. 1989) (court of appeals held that
the interpretation of a trust agreement is a matter of law to which the court reviews for
correctness); see also Crowther at 879-880.
Therefore, as the trial court made no finding that the Quitclaim Deed or the
Trust were ambiguous, the question of intent is gleaned from the four corners of the
deed and is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the
trial court. Crowther at 879-880.
Here, although the trial court may have made certain factual findings, which
Appellant has not challenged, many of those labeled factual findings are in reality legal
conclusions. For example, Appellee states that the court made a factual finding that
gifts were not allowed under the Trust. (Appellee's Brief at 24, Tr. At 832-833; R.
659.5). However, the record to which Appellee cites contains no such finding by the
court. Rather, the court simply stated as a legal conclusion that the Trust precluded the
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trustee, acting in the capacity of the trustee to convey a gift. (Tr. 832). Utah law is
clear that the interpretation of a trust, when resort to extrinsic evidence is not required,
is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Crowther at 879-880; Kline at 60.
Therefore, the trial court committed legal error in ruling that the Quitclaim Deed
did not operate to revoke or amend the Trust. Not only does the Trust Code provide
for a more liberal view of revoking revocable trusts, but case law demonstrates that
courts will look at legal acts with an eye towards the actor's intent as demonstrated by
the act.

See Waldron v. Commerce Union Bank, 577 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Term. 1978);

Enoch v. Enoch, 2006 WL 1006648 *5 (M.D. Term. 2006); Boulton v. Bronn, 2006
WL 563311 (Utah App. 2006).
Therefore, as the trial court specifically heard evidence and ruled on the effect of
the Quitclaim Deed at trial, Appellant was not required to challenge a provisional ruling
on a motion in limine. Further, the issue of the effect of the Quitclaim Deed is in fact a
question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. Crowther at 879-880.
2.

The Quitclaim Deed is Effective to Revoke the Trust, Both Pursuant
to Common Law Principles and According to the Trust Code

Despite Appellee's attempt to persuade this Court to affirm the trial court's
ruling based on procedural attacks of Appellant's brief, the law is well established that
when a settlor creates a revocable trust and subsequently conveys property out of the
trust, "the conveyance itself is an implied revocation of the trust, since the trustee and
10

the beneficiary are divested of all interest in the trust." Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 WL
563311 (Utah App 2006), 2006 UT App. 91 *1.
Further, case law and secondary authorities are uniform in establishing the
principle that a power to revoke the trust will be interpreted as including a power to
revoke the trust in part by withdrawing a part of the trust property from the trust.
(Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) § 330, Comment N). Furthermore, and as set
forth in Appellant's Brief, courts throughout the country, including Utah, have
routinely held that where a settlor conveys or indicates another use for a specific asset
held in a revocable trust, such conveyance or indication demonstrates the settlor's intent
to modify or revoke the trust with respect to that property. See Waldron v. Commerce
Union Bank, 577 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Term. 1978); Enoch v. Enoch, 2006 WL 1006648
*5 (M.D. Term. 2006); Boulton v. Bronn at *1.
Utah case law is consistent with the principle that "the power [to revoke] may be
exercised by any method which sufficiently manifests [Grantor's] intention to modify
[or revoke] the trust." In re Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 594 (Utah 2003); see also
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Section 331. Moreover, these authorities hold that a
conveyance of property out of a trust is a legally sufficient act to manifest the intention
to revoke, as to such property, despite not using explicit language of revocation or even
when the revoking instrument does not refer to the trust or state that it was revoking the
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trust. See Boulton at *1; Waldron at 675.
Here, it is clear that Eugene, acting as settlor and trustee, legally effectuated a
partial revocation of the Trust by signing an instrument (the Quitclaim Deed) which
conveyed the Farm out of the Trust to Russell.
a.

The Utah Uniform Trust Code is Applicable, the Issue was
Raised at Trial and the Trust Code Supports the Conclusion
that the Execution and Delivery of the Quitclaim Deed
Manifested the Intent to Revoke the Trust as to the Farm

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3), of the Utah Uniform Trust Code, sets forth
various methods by which a settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust. These
methods are: (1) by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of the
trust; or (2) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided in
the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by (a) specifically devising property that
would otherwise have passed according to the terms of the trust; or (b) any other
method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent. These
methods are in addition to any method provided for under the applicable trust
instrument.
The applicability of the Trust Code was raised and argued at the trial of this
matter. (Tr. 776-780). During the trial, Appellant argued and attempted to persuade
the court that the Trust Code was applicable and that the court should apply its
provisions with respect to the revocation of the Trust. (Tr. 776-780). However, the
12

trial court, in reviewing its earlier rulings, noticed that the Code was amended in 2004,
At that point, the Court and Counsel had the discussion referred to in Appellee's brief.
(Appellee's Brief at 29). However, Appellee has cited this dialogue in such a context
so as to claim that counsel had invited the trial court's error of not applying the Trust
Code to the case. (Appellee's Brief at 29). However, in fact, it was the trial court
which erred and stated to the parties that the Trust Code, as amended, was "not
controlling." (Tr. 830). Counsel did not stipulate with the Court's ruling. Instead,
counsel indicated more research would be required to respond to the Court's bench
ruling. (Tr. 829-830). This dialogue in no way invited the trial court to commit an
error of law when it ruled that the Trust Code did not control and govern the
interpretation of the Trust, nor does it somehow waive Appellant's right to challenge
the trial court's clear error of law on appeal.
Furthermore, counsel for Appellant did not agree with the court that provisions
of the Trust Code cited by Appellant were not controlling; rather, counsel merely
agreed with the court that the specific amended section of the Trust Code did not exist
prior to 2004. Tr. 829-830.
Further, the fact that the trial court, during oral argument, announced that the
Trust Code did not apply because it was enacted in 2004, and also because none of the
parties at that time were able to cite to § 75-7-1103(l)(a) (which provides that the Code
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applies retroactively to all trusts created before July 1, 2004), simply does not bind or
preclude a party from appealing a trial court's error of law. Therefore, as the
applicability of the Trust Code was raised during trial and as the trial court erred by not
applying it, said issue is properly before this Court for review.
Further, and important to a determination that the Trust Code applies
retroactively, the Boulton case was decided in 2006 in which this Court applied the
Trust Code retroactively to the events and Trust documents at issue. Specifically, this
Court applied the Trust Code's provision that where no specific method of revocation is
required, a settlor may revoke a trust in "any method manifesting clear and convincing
evidence of intent" to revoke. Boulton at *1 citing U.C.A. § 75-7-605 (Supp. 2004).
Moreover, and contrary to Appellee's argument that the Trust Code does not
apply to acts done before July 1, 2004, Boulton retroactively applied the Trust Code as
amended in 2004 to the settlor's acts which necessarily took place before enactment of
the Trust Code hi 2004.2 As such, this Court has retroactively applied the Trust Code

2

Prior to the Court of Appeals' decision in March of 2006, the settlor of the trust in
Boulton sold two parcels of real property that were the primary assets of the trust. She
then deposited the funds from the sale into her personal bank account and later invested
the funds into two investment accounts in her own name and not as trustee of the trust.
Later, she and her husband moved to Virginia where she consolidated the investments
into a single account. Boulton at *7. Necessarily, all this had to occur before a trial
was conducted, an appeal taken, briefing completed and a decision rendered; which
would mean these acts took place prior to July 1, 2004.
14

to Trusts created prior to July 1, 2004 as well as acts taken before the amendment,
consistent with § 75-7-1103(l)(a).
Here, the facts are indistinguishable: Eugene executed and delivered the
Quitclaim Deed to Russell, thereby manifesting an unmistakable intent to transfer the
Farm out of the Trust. As such, the Trust Code is applicable to demonstrate that by
Eugene's legal acts, he manifested "clear and convincing evidence of intent" to revoke
the Trust. U.C.A. § 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii); Boulton at 1. Therefore, the Trust Code is the
controlling law governing all matters of interpretation regarding the Trust.
i.

The Trust Does Not Make Exclusive the Means Whereby
it Can be Revoked

The Trust Code provides that as an alternative to substantial compliance with the
terms provided in the Trust3, a settlor may revoke a revocable trust in whole or in part
by any method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent if the
terms of the trust do not provide a method of revocation or if the method provided in
the trust is not made expressly exclusive. U.C.A. § 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii) (emphasis
added). In this case, the Trust provides:
While either grantor is living, the trust created by this instrument may be
revoked, in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by Grantors, or the
survivor of them, and delivered to the Trustees.

3

For Appellant's argument on substantial compliance see Appellant's Brief at
A(l)(a).
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Trust § 2.01(a).
As such, it is clear that the Trust does not make exclusive the means whereby it
can be revoked but rather provides a method of revocation. Although Appellant argued
this point at the trial of this matter, the trial court erred when it ruled that the Trust
made exclusive the means whereby the it could be amended or revoked. (Tr. at 831,
833).
Therefore, as the Trust does not make exclusive the means whereby it can be
revoked, pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-7-605(3)(b) the settlors of the Trust could revoke the
Trust by any method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of their intent to
revoke. As stated in Appellant's Brief, Utah case law has also established that "the
power [to revoke] may be exercised by any method which sufficiently manifests [an]
intention to modify [or revoke] the trust." In re Estate of Flake, 71 P. 3d 594 (Utah
2003; see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Section 331.

C.

EUGENE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ACT ALONE TO CONVEY
PROPERTY AND REVOKE THE TRUST
1.

The Utah Uniform Trust Code Allows Either Spouse to Revoke the
Trust and This Issue was Raised at Trial

Under U.C.A. § 75-7-605(2), "[i]f a revocable trust is created by more than one
settlor, to the extent the trust consists of community property, the trust may be revoked
by either spouse acting alone. . ." Id. "Community Property" is defined as:
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Assets owned in common by husband and wife as a result of its having
been acquired during the marriage by means other than an inheritance or a
gift to one spouse, each spouse generally holding a one-half interest in the
property.
Blacks Law Dictionary, (8th ed., Thompson-West 1999).
Although Appellee is correct in asserting that Utah is not a traditional
community property state, the Utah Trust Code uses the term "community property"
for purposes of defining and giving meaning to certain property held in trust. The term
refers to property which the husband and wife own together which was acquired durmg
the marriage. As such, the Utah legislature specifically uses the term "community
property" in order to give meaning to the legislative basis upon which a spouse, acting
alone, can revoke a revocable trust.
Appellee simply argues that since Utah is not a "community property" state,
"the statute does not apply." (Appellee's Brief at 35). However, the statute is not
another state's law; rather, it is Utah's statute and courts must give meaning to the
legislature's words. ExxonMobil Corp. V. Utah State Tax Com'n. 86 P.3d 706, 710
(Utah 2003). It is absurd to contend that § 605(2) has no meaning or application. To
the contrary, it is clear that the Utah legislature's use of the term "community
property" is applicable to define a certain category of property held in trust for
purposes of a spouse's ability to act alone in revoking the trust as to that property.
This is the only reasonable interpretation that can be made of the statute.
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Further, the law and cases cited in Appellant's brief are instructive to
demonstrate that unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, a power to revoke as to
community property may be exercised by either spouse acting alone. (Appellant's Brief
at B(l)). Therefore, Eugene had the authority under Utah law to act alone to revoke
the Trust with respect to the Farm since the Farm was held by Eugene and Zelma as
their "community property."
Moreover, this issue was preserved for appeal when counsel argued to the trial
court that the Trust Code was applicable to demonstrate that the Quitclaim Deed was
effective to revoke the Trust by Eugene. Appellant clearly argued at trial that Eugene
had the right, acting alone, to revoke or amend (in whole or in part) the Trust on the
basis and authority of U.C.A. § 75-7-605. (Tr. 776-784).
2.

Eugene had the Authority to Revoke the Trust Pursuant to His
Durable Power of Attorney

Although the trial court ruled that Eugene legally did not act in his capacity as
the holder of the power of attorney in granting the Quitclaim Deed to Russell and that
the durable power of attorney did not grant Eugene the authority to act for Zelma (Tr.
836), such rulings are conclusions of law and are in clear error. Crowther at 779-880.
The unchallenged findings of fact in this case and well established law
demonstrate that a general durable power of attorney grants an agent the authority to
revoke a trust where the agent is given broad powers over the principal's affairs and
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where the durable power of attorney grants "full power of revocation." This is true
even though the power of attorney does not specifically identify the power to revoke the
trust. In re Schlagel Trust, 51 P.3d 1094, 1094 (Colo App 2002). In Schlagel the
court found that because the wife executed a durable power of attorney in favor of her
husband at the same time she and her husband created the trust, the parties intended
that the power of attorney was meant to allow each other the authority to revoke the
trust. Schlagel at 1096. Further, the court pointed to the fact that the power of
attorney specifically included the granting of "full power of revocation." Id.
The facts in this case are substantively identical. As is clear from the Durable
Power of Attorney, which was executed contemporaneously with the Trust, Zelma
granted Eugene full power of revocation over the Trust. (Appellant's Brief at B(3)).
Durable Power of Attorney for Zelma Davis, Exhibit E to Appellant's Brief. (Emphasis
added).
Appellee attempts to distinguish the case law but ultimately fails in his attempt.
Schlagel and First Union National Bank of Virginia v. Thomas, 1995 WL 1055807, at
3-4 (Vir. Cir. Ct. 1995) make clear that durable powers of attorney, executed jointly by
spouses simultaneously with a revocable trust, which grant "full powers of revocation",
do in fact grant authority to a spouse to partially revoke trusts with respect to certain
property.
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Moreover, Appellee's policy argument regarding the circumvention of the
Trust's stated purpose is unconvincing. If the trial court's ruling is upheld, the policy
would be, in effect, that although joint settlors of a revocable trust execute durable
powers of attorney, granting to each other full power of revocation in connection with
the execution of their trust, that doing so does not grant them the authority to make
decisions regarding the trust on behalf of each other. Such a conclusion would ignore
the clear intent of the settlors and does not make good policy sense.
Second, the trial court erred when it ruled that Eugene did not act for Zelma
pursuant to his Durable Power of Attorney. The court ruled that in order to act
pursuant to the Durable Power of Attorney, Eugene "would had to have two signatures
there, one indicating that he was acting on behalf of Ms. Davis in his capacity as a, her
attorney in fact." Tr. 836. This conclusion is a clear error of law which ignores and
goes against the overwhelming weight of case law. The trial court erred when it
refused to acknowledge or analyze the effect Eugene's preparation of the Quitclaim
Deed had on the effectiveness of the same for Eugene and Zelma Davis as Trustees and
Grantors. In preparing the Quitclaim Deed, Eugene set forth Zelma's and his name as
trustees and grantors, and then signed his name as acting for both him and Zelma. As
he was vested with "full power of revocation" under the Durable Power of Attorney,
Eugene had authority to act on Zelma's behalf to partially revoke the Trust as to the
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Farm property.
In his argument, Appellee fails to consider the clear weight of legal authority.
Numerous courts have addressed similar situations regarding agents' signatures under
durable powers of attorney and the various effects of such in binding their principals.
As stated in Appellant's brief, Kahn v. Royal Banks of Missouri, 790 S.W.2d 503
(Miss. Ct. App. 1990) sets forth the good policy reasons under which a spouse
exercises a durable power of attorney. (Appellant's Brief at B(3)(a)).
It is instructive to look at relevant Utah law with respect to the effect of an
agent's signature in binding the principal when the agent does not state he is signing in
a representative capacity. Under U.C.A. § 70A-3-402 of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code, Negotiable Instruments, "if the form of the [agent's] signature does
not show unambiguously that the signature is made in a representative capacity or the
represented person is not identified in the instrument, the representative is liable on the
instrument." U.C.A. § 70A-3-402(2)(b) (emphasis added). Although this law has
specific reference to transactions governed by the UCC, it is relevant to gain an
understanding of the policy and principles surrounding principal-agent relationships.
Appellee cites to the Schlagel case in support of his position that in order to act
as an agent under a durable power of attorney, the document must set forth that the
agent is signing in a representative capacity. (Appellee's Brief at 46).
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However,

Schlagel was cited by Appellant for the principle that if a general durable power of
attorney is executed at the same time as a revocable trust and grants broad powers to
the agent, the durable power of attorney allows an agent to act on behalf of the
principal to revoke the trust. Schlagel does not stand for the proposition that the form
of the agent's signature requires a separate statement that the agent is acting for the
principal in a representative capacity. Indeed, Utah law only requires that the principal
is identified as the instrument which the authorized agent executes. As such,
Appellee's citation to Schlagel on this point is immaterial and unhelpful to a
determination that Eugene legally acted in Zelma's stead under the Durable Power of
Attorney.
Further, under Kahn, the court found that even though the document did not
refer to the durable power of attorney or state that the agent was signing in said
capacity, the placement of the principal's name on the document gave notice to third
parties that the agent was indeed acting in a representative capacity. Kahn at 510.
Appellee has failed entirely to refute or distinguish the cases cited by Appellant.
Moreover, Appellee misstates the application and effect of U.C.A. § 70A-3402(2)(b). (Appellee's Brief at 47). Section 402(2)(b) provides that the principal will
be liable if the agent either signs in a representative capacity or the represented person
is identified in the instrument. Id. The trial court committed clear error when he ruled
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that Eugene was required to sign the Quitclaim Deed twice, one in his own capacity and
"one indicating he was acting on behalf of Ms. Davis in his capacity as her attorney in
fact." (Tr. 836).
Here, Eugene prepared and signed the Quitclaim Deed and properly identified
himself and Zelma as trustees and as grantors of the property under the Trust. As
such, he identified the person being represented and thereby gave notice to all third
parties that he was representing Zelma in his representative capacity. Kahn at 510. As
such, it is evident that he intended to demonstrate that he was acting on behalf of
himself and Zelma, as trustees and grantors, to partially revoke the Trust and deed the
Farm to Russell Young.
Additionally, in contrast to the trial court's and Appellee's position, the court in
Boulton held that it was immaterial that the revoking instrument did not specifically
state that such would operate as a revocation. Boutlon at 2. Moreover, the court held
that the trust was revoked even though the settlor/trustee signed the sale documents as
trustee. The court stated that it was totally appropriate to sign as trustee to assure the
legal validity of the conveyance as the trust was the title owner of the property. Id.
Therefore, the trial court erred when it failed to correctly analyze and apply
controlling law with respect to Eugene's exercise of his Durable Power of Attorney on
behalf of Zelma.
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3,

The Trust Provides that Should Either Grantor or Trustee Fail to
Serve then the Other May Act Alone; the Issue of Zelma's Failure to
Serve Was Raised at the Trial Level,

Appellee takes the position that because Appellant argued below that Zelma was
competent when she signed the Quitclaim Deed in 2003 that he is now precluded from
setting forth an alternate means whereby the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
(Appellee's Brief at 36-37.) However, Appellee mistakes the nature and significance of
Appellant's argument that Zelma failed to serve in her capacity as trustee. Appellant is
not challenging the trial court's finding that Zelma was incompetent to sign the
Quitclaim Deed; rather, Appellant is adopting that finding as controlling to demonstrate
the court's legal error in light of the trial court's finding that Zelma was incompetent.
As such, and because Appellant is not challenging the trial court's finding of fact, there
is no duty to marshal. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, J19, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184 (Utah
2004).
Under § 3.01 of the Trust (Substitute Trustee): "If either of the above named
trustees [Gene and Zelma Davis] fail or cease to serve for any reasons, the other may
serve alone." The trust further states that only if both of the original trustees, Gene
and Zelma, fail or cease to serve, are substitute trustees appointed. Id.
Here, the trial court made specific findings as to Zelma's incompetency and
ruled that since 1994 her mental condition had deteriorated steadily to the point that
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Zelma herself informed her Dr. that she was slowly losing her mind. (Tr. 859; 147).
As such, it is abundantly clear from the trial court's own findings and conclusions that
Zelma failed to serve as set forth by the terms of the Trust thereby authorizing Eugene
to act alone in partially revoking the Trust as to the Farm. This legal conclusion is a
necessary result compelled by the trial court's factual finding concerning Zelma's
mental incompetency and inability to serve. Although Appellee seeks to have it both
ways, i.e., that Zelma's signature on the Quitclaim Deed is invalid due to her
incompetence and that Eugene could not act alone in signing the Quitclaim Deed, logic
and the trial court's findings require it to be one or the other. Therefore, consistent
with the trial court's finding of Zelma's mental incompetence, Eugene would be legally
entitled to act alone.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above arguments, Appellant Russell Young respectfully requests
that this Court: (1) reverse the trial court's order that the conveyance of the Farm to
Russell Young by the Quitclaim Deed did not partially revoke the Trust as to the Farm,
(2) reverse the trial court's order that the Quitclaim Deed is void ab initio, (3) order
that the Quitclaim Deed was effective to partially revoke the Trust and convey the Farm
to Russell Young, and (4) remand the case for entry of a new judgment quieting title to
the Farm in Russell Young.
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